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ABSTRACT 
 
Online auctions are widely used in sales of collectible items and casual items. This mar-
ket is constantly growing due to the growing number of people with access to the inter-
net. Even in the newly emerged internet auctions, the traditional auction theory is still 
providing useful insights into the bidding strategies in auctions with given properties.  
The question regarding optimal bidding strategy is of interest due to the fact that it pro-
vides bidders an edge in competitive markets.  
 
Previous studies, which have mostly focused on the eBay-auction model, show that the 
optimal bidding strategy is to wait until the ending of an auction. These studies also 
show that there is a tendency to shift towards this strategy while gaining experience as a 
bidder. However, a closer examination reveals that the strategic advantages of late bid-
ding are obsolete in auctions with a soft-close ending rule, such as Huuto.net and Ama-
zon. While this has not been previously tested in Huuto.net, empirical results from Am-
azon have been as hypothesized. Testing these hypotheses is conducted in this study 
using similar statistical tests as the previous studies as the methodological approach. 
The tests are conducted on a data gathered from two product categories in Huuto.net: 
IPhones and Moomin mugs. This thesis provides a comparative insight into bidding 
strategies in online auctions with a soft-close ending rule. 
 
This study shows that late bidding does not occur in Huuto.net, but in fact quite the op-
posite. This study shows also that pure single-bidding occurs when a clearer common 
value component is present, and that the experienced bidders place fewer bids in both 
product categories. 
 
KEYWORDS: Auction, online, bidding, experience 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1961 a Canadian-born professor William Vickrey wrote a fundamental paper 
about different auction models used in practice. This was the first time in histo-
ry that auctions were studied with game-theoretic aspect. In his paper he exam-
ined the game-theoretical properties of sealed-bid first price auction, which was 
used by state agencies when putting goods and services out to tender. He found 
that by modifying this common auction in such a way that the winner pays the 
price of the second highest bid, it might be beneficial for both the seller and the 
buyer. This auction type is called second-price sealed bid auction, or Vickrey 
auction. (Vickrey 1961) 
 
Since auctioning as a pricing mechanism is important for its economic proper-
ties, it has been a focus of many studies. Twenty years after the Vickrey’s paper 
Myerson (1981) and Riley & Samuelson (1981) developed further the auction 
theory and discovered the revenue equivalence theorem. After this ground-
breaking discovery the auction theorists went on further with the development 
of optimal auctions (auctions that maximize the seller’s expected revenue). In 
addition to the revenue equivalence theorem, Myerson’s (1981) paper also con-
tributed to the optimal auction design for standard auctions, which was then 
developed further by Milgrom & Weber (1982) who developed the general 
model and McAfee & McMillan (1987) who developed the benchmark model. 
 
It has been shown many times, that from the game theoretic perspective, the 
optimal bidding strategy in second-price sealed bid auctions is to bid the value 
it has to the bidder. (Vickrey 1961: 20-21; Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1091; McAfee 
& McMillan 1987: 710) As simple as this may seem, this value is not always easy 
to determine. Some auctions, such as those selling antique and other collecti-
bles, can be seen as an independent private value auction. If the item auctioned 
has some resale value, such as cars or oil drilling rights, there is a common val-
ue factor involved. The value of this factor, however, might be estimated differ-
ently amongst bidders (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1094). Thus, the estimates of the 
common value factor influence the bids.  
 
On the other hand, a bid contains information of the common value factor of the 
item. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1094) Because of this, the optimal strategy in sec-
ond-price auctions is to bid at the last possible moment without revealing any 
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information to others. This strategy is weakly dominant when all the independ-
ent values are known and strictly dominant when the values are unknown.  
 
Most of the present-day auction sites (with eBay being the biggest) are using a 
so called proxy-bidding auction model. This mechanism can be seen as a varia-
tion of the English auction, since users are aware of the current winning bid and 
can increment it by bidding more. However, the proxy-bidding mechanism of-
fers users also the possibility to leave a secret high bid, according to which the 
software automatically increments the bid when competing bids arrive. Hence, 
the properties of the auction change and it starts to resemble more of a second-
price sealed bid auction (Lucking-Reiley 2000: 191), in which the final price of 
the auction is the amount of the second highest bid (see chapter 2.2 for more 
details). 
 
Even though the dominant strategy for the second-price sealed bid is always to 
bid one’s value, the bidders seem to fail doing so. Kagel & Levin (1993) con-
ducted one of the first laboratory experiments, finding that the theory is not 
aligned with the real-world, since the bidders tend to overbid in second-price 
sealed bid auctions. Garratt, Walker & Wooders (2012) conducted a similar ex-
periment, but with the emphasis on the previous experience in real-world sec-
ond-price sealed bid auctions. With their data, they found that the more experi-
enced bidders were not likely to bid their values, and that they showed no 
greater tendency to overbid or underbid. 
 
 
1.1. Research Problem 
 
The theory for optimal strategy for bidding in second-price sealed bid auction 
outdates the internet and then the modern online auction mechanisms by dec-
ades. In his paper, William Vickrey stated that the second-price mechanism 
would be beneficial for both the seller and the bidder, if the bidders bid their 
own personal valuation of the item. The reason for this is that even if the bidder 
would be intrigued by the increased chances of winning by bidding higher, this 
would result in an unfavorable situation. (Vickrey 1961: 20-21) 
 
This raises the question about what is the best approach for bidding in online 
auctions. There have been recent findings about this indicating that new users 
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learn the ways to win auctions fairly quickly, and that losing experiences make 
bidder’s learn even faster (Wang & Hu 2009: 260). Another study discovers that 
inexperienced users are more likely to place their bids earlier than more experi-
enced ones. One interesting discovery is also that with even after a small 
amount of experience points users start to place bids more rationally (Living-
ston 2010: 250). 
 
Empirical research has however found that bidders fail to bid their values and 
often overbid. Kagel & Levin (1993) conducted laboratory experiments which 
found that the tendency to overbid increased when moved from first-price auc-
tion to second-price and even further in the third-price auction. Andreoni & 
Miller (1995: 48-50) found that the systematic errors in bidding patterns may 
exist because of adaptive learning amongst the bidders. 
 
When applied to the real-world auction mechanism, such as EBay or Huuto.net, 
the optimal bidding strategy may naturally be different than the theoretical 
standard models, which are formed to enable the possibility to examine their 
game-theoretical properties. For example, in a real world setting, the assump-
tions the standard models contain may not be fulfilled. On this basis, it’s natural 
to assume, that the optimal bidding strategy may include some previously ab-
sent properties, or the existing properties may be dissimilar.  
 
To see any form of learning, there must be sequentiality. One important aspect 
of the sequential auctions is the bid’s ability to carry information. Sequential 
auctions have been studied from this informational aspect since the 1980’s. En-
gelbrecht-Wiggans & Weber (1983) concluded that the expected profit of a bid-
der is higher, if he has less information. Hausch’s (1986) study found an inter-
esting phenomenon in sequential auctions: because the bidders are aware that 
their bids reveal information to the following auctions, they have an incentive 
to underbid.  
 
The question of optimal bidding strategy has been under a growing interest of 
studies. A great deal of the research is focused on the EBay-auction site (Wilcox 
2000; Rogers, Davis, Jennings & Schiff 2007; Wang & Hu 2009; Livingston 2010, 
to name a few), while only a few studies have focused on any other platform 
(Ockenfels & Roth 2002; Park & Bradlow 2005). The consensus has been for a 
long time that the optimal bidding strategy is to bid late, or snipe. This is to 
10 
 
avoid revealing information (Bajari & Hortacsu 2003: 338) and to protect from 
shilling (Barbaro & Bracht 2004: 11). There is even online software available that 
automate the auction sniping process (ezsniper.com, gixen.com, auctionsnip-
er.com etc.)  
 
The phenomenal work by Ockenfels & Roth (see Ariely, Ockenfels & Roth 2005; 
Ockenfels & Roth 2002, 2006) has had a huge contribution on the knowledge 
about the effects different ending rules have on optimal bidding strategy. The 
ending rules have not been under examination in the previous standard auction 
models, making their approach quite new. Since the EBay-model and the model 
used in Huuto.net are dissimilar only by their ending rules, it is necessary to 
consider what impact it has. Based on their research, it can be stated that auc-
tion sniping is not the dominant strategy in auctions that have a soft-closing 
method. They conducted controlled experiments (Ariely et al. 2005) and used 
the Amazon-auction site (Ockenfels & Roth 2006). Unless the difference be-
tween EBay and Amazon is because some other reason than the ending method, 
the results from Huuto.net should be similar. 
 
On this basis, the aim for this thesis is to find whether the results from 
Huuto.net are similar to those from Amazon, which is that there is no incentive 
to shift towards late bidding and that single-bidding becomes more prevalent 
while the bidders gain experience. 
 
 
1.2. The Structure of the Thesis 
 
Auction theory is discussed in chapter 2. First, some terminology regarding 
auctions is explained in chapter 2.1. After this, the standard auction types in 
auction literature are introduced in chapter 2.2, which are the English, Dutch, 
first-price sealed bid and second-price sealed bid auction. The value models 
(independent private values and common values) are introduced in chapter 2.3. 
These are all needed to understand the revenue equivalence theorem and its 
assumptions, which is then unveiled in chapter 2.4. 
 
After the explanation of the key aspects of the relevant sides of auction theory, 
chapter 2.5 opens up the concept of feedback score and explains how this is re-
11 
 
lated to user experience based on previous studies. Finally, in chapter 2.6 the 
two hypotheses are revealed. 
 
The empirical part begins from chapter 3. Chapter 3.1 focuses on describing the 
data. First, in chapter 3.1.1 the methods of gathering the data are presented. The 
data was gathered using the web scraping technology, which is opened in this 
chapter. An overview over the data is given in chapter 3.1.2., where descriptive 
statistics are presented and examined, with some figures to visualize the data.  
 
Finally in chapter 3.2, the two hypotheses are tested with the data. Two linear 
mixed models to test hypothesis 1 are constructed and conducted in chapter 
3.2.1. In chapter 3.2.2. hypothesis 2 is tested first by comparing the means of 
submitted bids on different feedback levels and then using cross tables to see 
the use of single-bids on different feedback levels. The tests and their results are 
described with more detail in the chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. Ultimately, conclu-
sions are made in chapter 4. 
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2. AUCTION THEORY 
 
An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules deter-
mining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the mar-
ket participants. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 701) 
 
This chapter is divided into 6 subchapters. First, some related terminology is 
explained, so that the further chapters are understandable. Second, the standard 
auction types used in auction literature are explained. In chapter 2.3 the differ-
ent valuation models are compared. The revenue equivalence theorem and its 
limitations can then be introduced in chapter 2.4. On this basis, the principles of 
measuring experience via feedback score are presented in chapter 2.5, after 
which the hypotheses are finally revealed in chapter 2.6. 
 
 
2.1. Properties of an Auction 
 
Before further discussion of auction types, it is necessary to go through some 
terminology involving auctions. These will be briefly presented in this chapter. 
As Parsons, Rodriquez-Aguilar & Klein (2011, 10: 3) stated, the terminology has 
not become universal although these properties are widely known in the auc-
tion literacy. These properties are independent as every combination of these is 
fully functional and choice of one property does not exclude other options. 
(Parsons et al. 2011 10: 3) 
 
Single- or multi- dimensional auction  
In single-dimensional auction only the price of a good is considered, while in 
multi-dimensional auction also the quality of the product or other aspects are 
present in the bids.  
 
One-sided and two-sided auction 
In one sided auction bidders are only sellers or buyers, while in two-sided auc-
tions the bidders can be either. 
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Open-cry and sealed-bid auction 
In open cry auctions the bidders know the amount of other bids, while in 
sealed-bid auction only the auctioneer has access to them. 
 
First-price or k-th price 
In first-price auction, the winner will pay the amount of the highest bid, while 
in k-th price auction the winner pays the k-th highest bid.  
 
Single-unit or multi-unit 
It is possible to auction multiple units of the same good simultaneously.  This is 
called multi-unit auction. Single-unit auction has only one unit of the good.  
 
Single-item or multi-item 
Single-item auctions have only one good, while multi-item (or combinational) 
auctions have multiple kinds of goods simultaneously. (Parsons et al. 2011 10: 3-
4) 
 
In addition to these, there are also different ending rules in online auctions, hard 
close and soft close. In hard close auctions, the auction ends strictly at a pre-given 
time, as opposed to soft-close, in which the auction’s ending time is extended if 
bids appear in the last minutes. This has an impact on the optimal bidding 
strategy. (Ockenfels & Roth 2006: 298) There is evidence showing that the soft-
close method results in more revenue (see Ariely et al. 2005: 901-902) 
 
 
2.2. Standard Auction Types 
 
Although all of the combinations of the properties described in chapter 2.1 
would make more or less functional auctions, some of them are examined more 
frequently than others. The four types presented in this chapter are considered 
the standard auctions, because of the wide use and analysis over the years 
(Klemperer 1999: 3). McAfee & McMillan (1987: 702) described the four basic 
types of auctions, which are described in this chapter. Considering the proper-
ties described earlier, these four types differ in terms of open-cry vs. sealed-bid 
and first-price vs. k-th price properties. 
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English Auction 
 
English auction is the most common auction form used in selling goods.  In this 
auction form bids are successively incremented either by an auctioneer or by 
the bidders themselves. This will be continued until no more bids are present-
ed. The winner of the auction is then the bidder who bid highest and he pays 
the amount of his bid, thus being a first price auction. Essential part of the Eng-
lish auction is that on any given time every bidder is aware of the current high-
est bid, making it an open-cry auction. (McAfee & McMillan 1987:  702)  
 
Dutch auction 
 
Dutch auction differs from English auction in that the auctioning mechanism is 
reversed. First the high price is called by the auctioneer, who then continues to 
lower the price until one bidder accepts the price. Properties of the Dutch auc-
tion are the otherwise same as they are in English auction. (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 702) 
 
First-price sealed bid 
 
When the first-price sealed bid auction is in use, the auctioneer collects bids 
from potential buyers. The bids are then compared and the bidder with the 
highest bid will then collect the item for the price he bid. The difference be-
tween the English auction and the first-price sealed bid auction is that the bid-
ders are not aware of other bids, making it impossible to revise the bids accord-
ing to other bids. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 702)  
 
Second-price sealed bid 
 
The second- price sealed is similar to the first-price sealed bid, as the bidders 
submit bids to the auctioneer without knowing what other potential buyers 
have bid. The winner of the auction is whoever bid highest, but the selling price 
is not the amount of the highest bid. Instead, the final selling price is the second 
highest bid.  (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 702) 
 
Most previous studies assume that the proxy-bidding model is in fact a second-
price sealed bid auction. Zeithammer & Adams (2010) were the first ones to test 
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this sealed-bid abstraction, finding that that most people using online auction 
sites bid reactively, and that the pressure to adopt the sealed-bid strategy is 
weak, stating that both reactive and rational bidding strategies might coexist in 
all groups regardless of their experience. In response to this, Srinivasan and 
Wang stated in their commentary (2010: 5) that even though not all inexperi-
enced bidders become rational with experience, the previous results clearly 
show that the tendency to become a rational bidder is increased.  
 
 
2.3. Value Models 
 
One of the fundamental issues in auction theory is the two paradigms of prod-
uct valuation. These paradigms are essential in understanding the auction theo-
ry, thus being introduced in this thesis.  
 
The equilibrium of optimal bid/sale is different whether the auction is private 
value or common value, so it is of significant importance to acknowledge which 
one is in use on a given auction. If the bidder knows the auction is held on 
common value setting, it is rational to bid lower to prevent a winner’s curse, 
which means that the winning bid is higher than the true value of the item. The 
concept of common value setting is explained further on in this chapter. (Boat-
wright, Borle & Kadane 2010: 88) 
 
It is not easy to determine which valuation model is dominant on a given auc-
tion, as the distinction between the two categories can’t be done by current eco-
nomic theories (Laffont 1997: 28) and even the experts have strong opposing 
views on which products constitutes the value categories (Boatwright et al. 
2010: 93). To simplify, one distinctive difference is whether you think about the 
resale value (common value) or the value for yourself (private value) when you 
are buying the product (Boatwright et al. 2010: 95). 
 
Independent private values 
 
The independent private value model is in place when there is a single com-
modity being auctioned for multiple bidders. Each one of these bidders then 
valuates how much the commodity is worth to himself, while not knowing how 
the others have valuated. This is called the private values assumption. Regard-
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less to the auction type in use, the dominant strategy for the auction is to bid the 
amount of this estimated private value. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1090-1093) 
 
This model assumes that the bidders are risk-neutral and that they know their 
own valuation of the product. The private values assumption notes that these 
values are private; hence the bidders are not aware of other valuations. 
(Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1090) 
 
Milgrom & Weber (1982: 1090–1093) states that at least seven important conclu-
sions emerge from this model: 
 
1. The Dutch and the first price auction are strategically equivalent. 
2. The second-price sealed bid and the English auction are equivalent, alt-
hough in a weaker sense than strategically equivalent. 
3. The winner is the bidder who valued the item the most in the English 
and second-price auctions, and this is Pareto-optimal. 
4. In the independent private values model, all four auction models lead to 
identical expected revenues for the seller. 
5. In equilibrium, when the bidder who values the item most is certain to 
receive it, the expected revenue generated for the seller is exactly the 
second highest evaluation amongst the bidders. 
6. For many common sample distributions, the standard auction forms 
with suitable reserve prices or entry fees are optimal auctions. 
7. If the seller or the buyers are risk averse, the seller will prefer to use the 
Dutch or the first-price auction. 
 
Some of these conclusions link to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which 
will be discussed in chapter 2.5 separately because of its significance.  
 
Common value 
 
Traditionally oil drilling rights have been seen as common value auction (also 
called mineral rights model). At first it may seem that the value would be equal 
for all bidders, but the estimate of the common value may vary among bidders 
ex ante. A classic example of this is when a jar full of coins is being auctioned. 
Other factors being equal, the winner will be the bidder with the highest esti-
mate. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1093-1094) 
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Suppose then, that the bidder receives information about other bidders’ valua-
tions. In a common value auction, the bidder might benefit from this new in-
formation and adjust his own valuation accordingly. In independent private 
values auction the bidder’s valuation would not change, although he might 
change his bid for tactical reasons. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 705) 
 
Common value auctions are sometimes called pure common value auctions, to 
distinct it from the term common value. Any item may hold a common value 
component if there is a resale opportunity, or in other words, if the other bidders 
have private information about the value its owner would acquire (Haile 2003: 
80). Wilcox (2000) has stated that a possible common value component may 
cause the bidders to be uncertain about valuating items even on private value 
auctions. 
 
 
2.4. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem 
 
The revenue equivalence theorem is best described in the McAfee & McMillan 
(1987) paper. It is based on four assumptions, which form the so called bench-
mark model: 
 
1. The bidders are risk neutral. 
2. The independent private values assumption applies. 
3. The bidders are symmetric. 
4. Payment is a function of bids alone. 
 
When these assumptions apply, the model is called the benchmark model. 
However, in the real world auctions this is often not the case. Later in chapters 
2.5.1 to 2.5.4 these assumptions are relaxed one at a time to discuss the effects 
they have in designing optimal auctions. 
 
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem answers the question which of the auction 
types the seller should choose in order to maximize profits. The answer is sur-
prising: they all yield the same revenue. But how can it be so? Wouldn’t the 
price be higher if the winner paid the amount of the highest bid rather than sec-
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ond highest? The answer is simple; the bidders use different bidding strategies 
in different types of auctions. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 706-707) 
 
The proof of the revenue equivalence theorem is quite simple (see e.g. Klempe-
rer (1999: 41-44).  It was first presented by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samu-
elson (1981), although even Vickrey’s paper (1961) had hints about the equiva-
lence in expected revenues in different auctions. Because the mathematical 
proof of the theorem is outside of this thesis’s scope, it will be left out. Howev-
er, as it is of essential importance in the field of auctions, it will be discussed 
here briefly.  
 
Given that all the bidders with the same valuation bid the same amount (as-
sumption 3).  Then all the bidders draw their valuations from the same proba-
bility distribution    (which is the density function denoted by f). All the bid-
ders are aware of this, but know only their own valuation (making auction a 
Bayesian game).  Suppose that the bids are v1, v2 . . . vn, and the biggest bid is v1 
(first order statistic), the second highest is v2 (second order statistic) and so on. Be-
cause of assumption 2, the winner of the auction is whoever values the item the 
most. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 707) 
 
Consider the English auction. As the auction process advances, finally only two 
bidders are left in the auction. The auction ends when v2 is reached; there is no 
incentive for the bidder with this valuation to continue bidding. Because the 
winning bid should be lower than   , the winner will gain some economic rent 
for winning the auction.  Hence, the economic rent that the winning bidder gain 
is v1 -v2 and the expected value of this is[   (  )]  (  ). (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 707-708) 
 
On this basis the equation for the expected payment the seller receives in an 
English auction can be formed as follows 
 
 (  )      
[   (  )]
 (  )
 
 
In the second-price sealed bid auction, the equilibrium strategy for all bidders is 
to bid the amount of their valuation. If the bidder i chooses to use a bid     , 
which is lower than this valuation   , there is a possibility that the winning bid 
(1)
  [   (  ) 
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would be lower than    but higher than     making him lose the auction. On the 
other hand, if he chooses to bid    , maybe attracted by its better chances at 
winning, there might occur a bid that is higher than his valuation    but lower 
than    , causing him a deficit of         . With this reasoning, it is optimal for 
him to bid    and nothing else. Because of this, the expected payment received 
by the seller is also (  ). (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 708) 
 
The first-price sealed bid auction differs from this by that the bidders can only 
guess what the other bidder’s valuations are. Because of this, there is no domi-
nant equilibrium strategy. If the bidder bids his true value    and happened to 
win the auction, he would gain no economic rent. In order to receive it, he must 
place his bid somewhere below  , but still higher than what he believes to be 
the second highest bid. To put this in mathematical form, any other bid is of the 
amount  (  ) when the valuation is   . (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 708 – 709) 
 
When the bidder’s valuation is   , bidding an amount of    results in gaining 
economic rent       . Winning the auction means that    all     bidders have 
valued the item with       , thus (  )     . Given the distribution of valua-
tions   like in equation 1, the probability to win the auction is  [   (  )
   ] 
and the expected surplus the winner gains is as follows: (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 709) 
 
    (     )( [ 
  (  )] 
    
 
Differentiating this with respect to   , we can form the equation that the optimal 
bid needs to satisfy: 
 
   
   
 ( [   (  )]   ) 
 
In order to fulfill the rational-expectations requirement of Nash equilibrium, it 
must be imposed that all bidders are using the function   consistently and ra-
tionally. Moreover, it must be required that the bidders are symmetrical; hence 
the bidder with valuation    bids  (  ). By substituting this into (3), the equa-
tion for bidder  ’s expected surplus at Nash equilibrium is (McAfee & McMillan 
1987: 709) 
 
(2)
  [   (  ) 
(3)
  [   (  ) 
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 [ (  )]
    
 
 
The decision rule for all bidders can be obtained by solving this function for   
by integrating it. The lower boundary of the integral is    , which is the lowest 
possible valuation and which gives the bidder zero surplus. The equation for 
the decision rule can then be formed, using the Nash condition and the defini-
tion of   in equation (2): (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 709) 
 
 (  )      
∫ [ ( )]     
  
  
[ (  )]   
 
 
Note that in Nash equilibrium all the bidders          must be maximizing 
their expected surplus simultaneously, so that (4) holds. 
 
The problem that the seller faces is that he is not aware of   , the highest valua-
tion amongst distribution  , although he must decide which auction model to 
use in order to obtain the maximum surplus. For English and second-price 
sealed bid auctions, the price is  (  ) as formed in equation (1) and equals   . 
For Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions the price is  (  ) as formed in 
equation (5), and is the expectation of    conditional of    . The revenue equiva-
lence theorem states that results for all four auction types are equal on average, 
meaning that on average the values for  (  ) and   (  ) are the same. However, 
by chance when    and     are equal, will the price be same. (McAfee & McMil-
lan 1987: 708-710) 
 
Developing the optimal auction on this basis is just a small step away. In an effort 
to maximize his profits, the seller must design such an auction that gains him 
the highest expected utility. 
 
This theorem is important to introduce in this thesis, because the users of 
Huuto.net auction site can place their bids incrementally (English auction) or 
place one bid, which the system then automatically compares to other bids and 
increments when new bid occur until the limit (second-price sealed bid auc-
tion). Because of the identical outcomes of these two auction types, there should 
be no economic incentive for the bidders to start favouring either one.  
(4)
  [   (  ) 
(5)
  [   (  ) 
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However, it is important to keep in mind, that the real-world situation may not 
have the same outcomes as the benchmark model. From the seller’s point of 
view, Lucking-Reiley (1999) found that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent 
higher revenues than the other standard auction types; and that the English 
auction and the second-price auction have roughly similar outcomes. 
 
2.4.1. Asymmetric Bidders 
 
In a case, where all the bidders do no draw their valuations from the same dis-
tribution , but use more than one distribution, the bidders are called asymmet-
ric or non-homogenous. Asymmetry may be caused by legislation, when state 
contracts are auctioned with different terms between domestic and foreign 
companies, or when the bidders are divided between collectors and dealers, 
resulting in different valuations or signals. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 714) The 
auction literature has identified three ways to separate the distributions. These 
are differences in private values, almost common value settings, and differences 
caused by dissimilar information. Because of the differences may vary in nu-
merous ways, it is not easy to form a general result. (Klemperer 1999: 17-21) In 
this chapter, assumption 3 is relaxed while assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are main-
tained. 
 
This means that the bidder with the highest value receives the item and the op-
timal bidding strategy is to bid one’s value. The first-price sealed bid yields a 
different outcome, which is because the bidder faces different sets of bidders 
from which to draw his expectation of   . Ultimately this results in the breaking 
of the revenue equivalence theorem (McAfee &McMillan 1987: 714-715). The 
expected revenue of the first-price sealed bid can be higher or lower than the 
English auction when asymmetry of bidders occurs. (Vickrey 1961:21) 
 
When there is two different distributions, equation (1) can be derived to the fol-
lowing form, in which   
  is the bidder  ’s in class   valuation for the item:  
 
  (  
 )     
  
[    (  
 )]
  (  
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(6)
  [   (  ) 
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Because       ,   (  )      (  )  Then again, because    is not a function of  
 ( ), the auction may result in such outcome, that  ( ( )
  )      ( ( )
  ), even if 
 ( )
    ( )
 . The optimal auction should result in such outcome, that the bidder 
with the biggest valuation wins the product, hence it can be shown that when 
asymmetry of bidders occurs, the auction may not be optimal. (Myerson 1981: 
67-68, McAfee & McMillan 1987: 715) 
 
2.4.2. Royalties and Incentive Payments 
 
The fourth assumption of the benchmark model declares that the payment for 
the bidder is a function of bids alone. This type of auction can be in the seller’s 
interest when the value of the item is not known ex ante, but can be known im-
perfect ex post. This occurs when e.g. drilling rights or book publishing rights 
are auctioned. (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 717) Royalties and incentive pay-
ments are not used in EBay or Huuto.net, which makes it trivial to examine in 
this thesis. However, to satisfy the reader’s curiosity and to complete the chap-
ter, it can be discussed here briefly. 
 
Deviating from the single payment to the more complex payment function re-
sults that the payment   depends on some other variable than the bid . Because 
the ex post value of the item can’t be known beforehand, the bidder needs to 
estimate the value  ̃ that it causes after the auction. If the auction mechanism 
chosen so, a certain royalty rate   of this value is paid to the seller. On this basis, 
when the payment includes royalties or incentive payments, the total payment 
to the seller is a linear function as follows: (McAfee & McMillan 1987: 717) 
 
      ̃ 
 
The seller is not aware of the bidder’s valuations, but he would benefit from 
any information about the valuations. 
 
2.4.3. Risk-Averse Bidders 
 
Optimal bidding strategies for the second-price sealed bid or the ascending bid 
auctions do not change whether the bidders are risk-neutral or risk-averse. 
(Klemperer 2000: 14) Therefore, the bidding strategies for EBay or Huuto.net 
remain unchanged. Furthermore, with risk-averse bidders the expected price 
(7)
  [   (  ) 
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for the English auction is at least as much as it is for the second-price sealed bid 
auction. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1116) However, with higher risk bidders the 
first-price auction results in higher bids and the resulting price is higher than in 
the second-price sealed bid auction. (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1114) 
 
Waehrer, Harstad & Rothkopf (1998) provided a full review of the seller’s pre-
ferred choice of the standard auction models, with different risk-levels of the 
bidders. Their conclusion was that when the bidders are risk-averse, it is in the 
seller’s interest to prefer English auction over the first-price auction, and vice 
versa. (Waehrer et al. 1998: 189) 
 
2.4.4. Independent Private Values Assumption 
 
In this chapter assumptions 1, 3 and 4 are maintained, while assumption 2 is 
relaxed. Because of this, the hazard of falling into the winner’s curse is possible. 
To prove this, consider first that the auctioned item is a pure common value 
item. In this case, all the bidders have to estimate this value, and whoever has 
the highest valuation, hence places the highest bid, wins the auction. Because 
the item has no private value to the buyer and the pure common value is the 
same for all bidders, and all the other bidders estimated its value lower, the 
winner of the auction has no way to profit from the resale of the item. (McAfee 
& McMillan 1987: 720-721) 
 
 
2.5. Feedback Score and Experience 
 
Mutual trust between the seller and the bidder partners is crucial on online auc-
tions.  After the auction has ended, the usual procedure is that the seller con-
tacts the winner and sends the product after it has been paid. This practice is 
highly risky as the buyer has to trust that the product is as described and the 
seller will ship it. Regardless to the auction type, there is always a risk of being 
defrauded. This trust was first studied by Resnick & Zeckhauser (2002), who 
found that more than half of  the early users (the data was collected in 1999) left 
feedback in EBay, however this has likely been changed over the years and is 
certainly not comparable to the Huuto.net today. 
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This has led to the development of the feedback systems, in which the users can 
reward each other with positive feedback scores and on the other hand, penal-
ize the users that they advise not to do business with. As users get more in-
volved in online auctions and ultimately win auctions, their feedback score may 
raise. These feedback-scores are used as an indicator of user experience in many 
earlier studies (see for instance Wilcox 2000; Ockenfels & Roth 2006; Wang & 
Hu 2009; Livingston 2010; Srinivasan & Wang 2012).  
 
These points are visible to all users, making it possible for every user to evalu-
ate their trading partner beforehand. Ironically, this invoked a new form of dis-
honesty, as sellers began to give negative feedback in return to those whom 
they had received it. This resulted in 2008 to a change in feedback system, 
which made the sellers able to leave only positive feedback or no feedback at 
all. (EBay, 2008) This should be kept in mind when reading pre-2008 studies, as 
the feedback scores are not perfectly comparable. 
 
Feedback score, however, is not a perfect measurement to see a user’s experi-
ence. Garratt et al. (2011: 47) presented three reasons for this: (i) users don’t al-
ways leave feedback, (ii) feedback is given only to those who win the auction, 
and (iii) feedback can be given only after an auction has ended with sale. Wang 
& Hu (2009: 255) noted that because the learning comes mostly from losing ex-
periences, the use of feedback score do not display the nature of the learning 
process. Thus, experience per se is not the driving reason behind learning.  
 
These reasons were formed on the grounds of the limitations of eBay’s feedback 
system, but they also apply for Huuto.net. In Huuto.net negative feedback can 
be given, which decreases the score and makes the user look less experienced 
than the others. However, it is impossible to receive lots of positive feedback 
without participating at least in an equal amount of auctions, making this 
measurement a valid to use. Another obvious reason to the use of feedback 
score as the estimate of user experience is that there is no way of finding out the 
bidder’s true experience of online auctions. 
 
In addition to the plain experience in online auctions, also the quality of it 
seems to have an impact. Wang & Hu’s (2009) study followed 131 new users for 
over a six-month period, and the results were that those users whose participa-
tion in the auction did not result in a win, were likely to change their bidding 
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behavior towards submitting fewer bids and submitting them closer to the end. 
The winning bidders were not likely to change their pattern. 
 
As Livingston (2010: 249) stated, some of the bidders with less experience may 
actually be other identities of the seller used for shill bidding (bidding with the 
hope of higher end price). This is impossible to identify, but important to keep 
in mind when judging whether or not the feedback score is a reliable measure-
ment for experience. 
 
There are a few reasons to doubt the credibility of the EBay’s reputation system. 
First, because the reports may be fake (e.g. shill bidding), the rational bidder 
will base their judgment on it. Second, there is no incentive in leaving feedback, 
so users may not be using it, hence the reputation displayed by the feedback 
score may not be “correct”.  Third reason is that even the user’s left negative 
feedback, the user may create a new identity without being banned from the 
site (Livingston  2005: 453).  These altogether may be the reason why bidders 
strongly reward (by giving positive feedback) the honest sellers for the first few 
times they have auctioned items, but after that the marginal returns are plum-
meting (Livingston 2005: 463) 
 
The seller’s reputation impacts on the bidders differently between experienced 
and inexperienced bidders. Livingston (2010: 244) studied this effect and found 
that the inexperienced bidders bid more on average than the experienced bid-
ders, and that their bids are the same regardless of the seller’s reputation.  
Sellers with higher reputation also gained higher prices than those with no rep-
utation at all. In other words, bidders were more likely to place higher bids to 
those with an established reputation. However, the marginal gains slowed 
quickly after first positive feedbacks. But then again, one reason for this may 
also be that the seller’s learned how to promote and market their products bet-
ter. 
 
One other interesting finding was when Ockenfels & Roth (2002: 13) found that 
the less inexperienced bidders see other bids by known experts (measured by 
bidding history and reputation) as a free authentication and this leads to a 
greatly higher price in common value settings. 
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2.6. Hypotheses 
 
The auction mechanism used in Huuto.net lets users to place multiple bids dur-
ing an auction. For example, if the user’s bid has been superseded by another 
user, he can bid higher and gain back the winning position.  It also allows the 
user to let the system increment the bids automatically. By these means the 
Huuto.net auction is identical to the EBay auction, making the previous studies 
comparable with this thesis. 
 
The two hypotheses used in this thesis have previously been tested by at least 
Wilcox (2000), Boatwright et al. (2006), Wang & Hu (2009) and Livingston 
(2010). They all found the relationship between experience and the probability 
to bid (i) fewer bids and (ii) submit their bids later. In addition to these, Ocken-
fels & Roth (2002) found that the probability for last-minute bidding is higher 
amongst more experienced bidders even whether the auction had a hard close 
(EBay) or a soft close (Amazon, Huuto.net).  
 
While Wilcox and Livingston used only the feedback score as a measurement of 
a bidder’s experience, Wang & Hu used the actual participation in auctions by 
following the users for a six-month period and found that the relationship is 
prevalent by both measurements, while the actual experience gives a stronger 
correlation. The results of these studies are discussed in more detail during the 
last two chapters. 
 
There is another crucial difference between auctions and the Huuto.net, which 
may affect the bidding behavior. The difference comes from the fact that users 
have to choose to use automatic incrementing in Huuto.net, whereas in EBay 
they have no choice but to use it. It can be speculated whether or not this affects 
the bidding behavior, but as Ockenfels & Roth (2006: 317) stated, placing a sin-
gle bid near the end of the auction is the best response even to incremental bid-
ding and results in a smaller price.  
 
2.6.1. Timing of the Bids 
 
The first hypothesis is based on the assumption that all bids display infor-
mation about the value of the item, thus early bidding gives out information to 
other bidders. Previous studies have mainly based their evidence from data col-
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lected from EBay. The EBay’s proxy bidding model has a hard ending, meaning 
that the auction ends at a previously stated time. This model makes auction snip-
ing (bidding at the last possible moment) the best strategy for winning auctions. 
(Ariely et al., 905-906) Rogers et al. (2007) examined the properties of proxy-
bidding even further, and concluded that the best time to place a bid is indeed 
near the end of the auction, but before the other snipers. 
 
The model used in Huuto.net postpones the ending by five minutes if the win-
ning bid is changed during the last moments of the auction, allowing other bid-
ders to react. This model has similar attributes to the Amazon model studied by 
Ariely et al. (2005). Their conclusion was that when the bidders have time to 
react to the last bid, there is no incentive for learning to bid their values. On the 
other hand, when there was no guarantee that the bid submitted in the last 
stage would be posted, bidders learned over time to value bid. (Ariely et al. 
2005: 902). It should be noted that the Amazon model they used was a simpli-
fied model made for a test environment, in which there was no concern about 
the possibility to miss the ending. In the real world this may not always be the 
case (bidders may not have the access to increment their bids in a five minute 
notice). In their survey, Ockenfels & Roth (2002: 14) found, that indeed 90% of 
the bidders said that they sometimes they have planned to bid late, but some-
thing unexpected has prevented them from submitting the bid. 
 
As stated before, previous studies have found that there is a correlation be-
tween the bidder’s experience and late bidding. (Wilcox 2000; Boatwright et al. 
2006; Wang & Hu 2009; Livingston 2010) and Boatwright et al. (2006) had a dif-
ferent finding: in their data of over 10 000 products they found that the most 
likely time for more experienced bidders to place bids were both at the begin-
ning of the auction and near the closing, when the less experienced bid during 
the whole auction. 
 
Because giving out one’s valuation in an early phase of the auction gives ad-
vantage to the competitors (Milgrom & Weber 1982: 1116), the best approach in 
second-price sealed bid auctions is to place bids at the final moments of the auc-
tion. Indeed the survey by Ockenfels & Roth (2002: 13) showed that highly ex-
perienced bidders are afraid that their bids share valuable information to other 
bidders, hence they had an incentive to place their bids late. 
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Differences in ending rules bring an interesting addition to this question. A 
more recent study on the field of the soft-close versus hard-close can be found 
from Ockenfels & Roth (2006). In their paper, they stated that the presence of 
soft-close ending rule makes it more difficult to achieve the late bidding equi-
libria, but it can’t be stated that there was no possible cases where late bidding 
would be the best response (2006: 307). Their approach is based on the assump-
tion that all bidders would be ready to react when a bid is submitted in the last 
phase (2006: 308).  
 
Further on, their extensive study on the ending rules suggests that the strategic 
gains that late bidding provides in EBay-style auctions are mostly nullified in 
Amazon-style auctions with dependent values; and that with private values, at 
equilibrium, the bidders place their bids whenever they first notice the auction 
(Ockenfels & Roth 2006: 310). Empirical findings also suggest this. In their data 
from October 1999 – January 2000, late bidding was greatly more prevalent in 
EBay, with 68% of auction’s last bids occurring in the last hour, while the same 
number was only 23% in Amazon. The difference was even bigger when only 
last bids submitted in the last 10 seconds were examined: they consisted of 12% 
of bids in auctions, while the number was 0% in Amazon (Ockenfels & Roth 
2006: 313). These results indicate clearly, that sniping did not occur in Amazon. 
 
On this ground, the first hypothesis is: 
  
H1: The bidder’s feedback score does not have a negative effect on the time be-
tween placing the final bid and the end of auction in Huuto.net 
 
2.6.2. Single Bidding 
 
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem states that under certain assumptions every 
auction mechanism gives the same revenue to the seller and ends with the same 
outcome. For the bidder this means that regardless of the auction type, the final 
price will be the same. Under this theorem it can be stated that the dominant 
strategy is to bid one’s own valuation (see chapter 2.5).  In second-price sealed 
bid auctions, this would lead to a single bid.   
 
Previous studies have focused on testing the bidder’s strategies in online auc-
tions. The study by Ockenfels & Roth (2006: 316) found that there is no evidence 
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that the bidder’s feedback score induces late bidding in Amazon, but it reduces 
multiple bidding. Also Wang & Hu (2009) found that whether measured by ac-
tual experience or the feedback score, the bidders with more experience tend to 
place fewer bids.  Wilcox’s (2000) study did not measure the actual number of 
bids submitted by an individual. Instead, he tested this hypothesis by calculat-
ing the mean experience level and comparing it to the amount of bids submit-
ted. By doing so, he found that the mean feedback score was indeed higher in 
those auctions that had fewer bids. 
 
While the different ending rule negated the strategic advantages of late bidding, 
the single-bid hypothesis is still valid. The controlled experiment by Ariely et al. 
(2005: 896) found no difference in the number of submitted bid between the 
soft-close and hard-close ending rules. Instead, they find that the over time, the 
bidders reduced the number of bids submitted in both EBay-like and Amazon-
like auctions (2005: 896) 
 
Bidders using incremental bidding strategy place their bids at any time of the 
auction and then increment their bids if they are superseded. This strategy 
leads to more bids and may even trigger bidding wars. Indeed, in the study by 
Ockenfels & Roth (2006: 316), the average feedback score of a single-bidder was 
higher than that of a multiple bidder. Thus, hypothesis 2 conjectures that more 
experienced bidders are more likely to place a single bid in an auction. 
 
H2: The likelihood that the bidder places a single bid on an auction correlates 
positively with the feedback score.  
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3. LATE AND SINGLE BIDDING ON HUUTO.NET 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. First, the methods of gathering the data and 
the overview of data are discussed in chapter 3.1. Secondly, the statistical tests 
are conducted in chapter 3.2. 
 
In order to get a good picture of the bidding behavior in Huuto.net, several tests 
are used in this thesis. The tests used for hypothesis 1 are similar to those used 
in Livingston’s paper (2010). Because it was possible to gather the data form 
Huuto.net with more details about the bidders, it was possible to test hypothe-
sis 2 with more sophisticated tests than those used by Wilcox (2000), who gath-
ered the data from EBay. The tests are described in chapter 3.3 and conducted 
in chapters 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 with focus on H1 and H2 respectively. 
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
As the web scraping technology may be new to reader, it is considered neces-
sary to explain the methodology of gathering the data in detail. This is done in 
chapter 3.1.1. An overview of the data is done in chapter 3.1.2, where the de-
scriptive statistics of the collected data at auction-level and at bid-level are ex-
amined. 
 
3.1.1. Collecting the Data 
 
Two different types of items auctioned were chosen to represent the different 
valuation models. As Wilcox (2000: 372-373) found, the bidder’s bid differently 
between products from the two valuation categories. As described in chapter 
2.3 items in common value category are such items that have similar values for 
every bidder. Contrary to this, items in the independent private values category 
have different values amongst bidders. Hence, IPhones were chosen to repre-
sent the independent private value category and Moomin mugs were chosen to 
represent the common values category. 
 
In previous studies the items for common-value category have been for exam-
ple ties and pottery (Wilcox 2000: 371), apparel, accessories, collectibles (Wang 
& Hu 2009:254). Items for the private values category have been for example 
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drills and staplers (Wilcox 2000: 371), golf clubs and video games (Livingston 
2010:239), consumer electronics, toys, vacation packages (Wang & Hu 2009:254). 
As was stated previously, any item may hold a common value component, 
which means that is has resale value and which may make the bidder uncertain 
about one’s valuation even in private value-settings (see chapter 2.3). Since the 
cycle of buying a new mobile phones was 6 years in 2010 (Entner 2011: 2), it is 
assumed in this thesis that IPhones are not bought for their resale value – how-
ever it is clear that this assumption does not always hold. Hence, there is defi-
nitely a common value component present in both product categories. 
 
The data was collected with two different keywords: “IPhone” and 
“Muumimuki”. There is a notably active collector’s market for Iittala’s mugs 
with Moomin-characters, which were chosen to represent the common value 
category. The second keyword represents the private value category. Since any 
differences between IPhone-models would not result in any different bidding 
behavior, the data consisted of several IPhone-models with different specifica-
tions. Similarly, all the Moomin mugs were accepted. 
 
The data was extracted from the Huuto.net web page using web scraping tech-
nology. The software used was called scrapinghub.com, which uses software 
named Scrapy Cloud, which is based on the Scrapy project. Web scraping is the 
process of gathering data from a web page. A spider is a program that performs 
the web scraping automatically. Using a spider consists of three phases: 
 
1. Defining the starting URLs 
2. Defining the patterns to follow 
3. Scraping the page 
 
Any search results are opened in Huuto.net in a web page, of which URL con-
tains the information of search queries. Sellstyle H stands for auctions; status C 
stands for closed auctions and words is the search query. Thus the following 
URLs were used as starting URLs: 
 
http://www.huuto.net/hakutulos/sellstyle/H/status/C/words/iphone 
http://www.huuto.net/hakutulos/sellstyle/H//status/C/words/muumimuki 
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The spider was programmed to follow three types of URLs. The first URL di-
rects the spider to the auction site, which are then to be scraped. The next two 
URLs are necessary for the spider to find paginated results, thus the word page 
in the URL. 
 
http://www.huuto.net /kohteet/ 
http://www.huuto.net/hakutulos/sellstyle/H/status/closed/words/iphone/page/ 
http://www.huuto.net/hakutulos/sellstyle/H/status/closed/words/muumimuki/page/ 
 
When the spider encounters a new web page, it tries to scrape the predefined 
items from it. In practice, this is made by creating a template from an auction 
page and showing the spider which information it’s supposed to gather. Should 
the spider not find the required fields on the page, it will move on to the next 
result. If a page with identical URL and identical contents is encountered, it is 
recognized as a duplicate. This is to avoid any pages to be scraped twice. How-
ever, this also resulted in some false duplicates some repeated auctions that did 
not contain any bids, thus they did not affect the results of this thesis in any 
way. 
 
 Following items were scraped from the auction pages: 
 
1. Name of the item 
2. Category of the item 
3. Time open 
4. Time of opening  
5. Time of closing 
6. Total number of unique bidders 
7. Total of bids 
8. Details of bids 
a. Name of the bidder (contains also the current feedback score) 
b. Amount of the bid 
c. Timing of the bid 
 
The date of collection was 25.4.2014. A simple search on the Huuto.net page 
resulted in 13 350 items with search query “IPhone” and 7 825 items with search 
query “muumimuki”, totaling in 21 175 ended auctions. The search feature in 
Huuto.net does not let the user to set a time limit for the search. Instead, old 
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items are removed automatically after a certain period of time. At the time of 
conducting the search, the oldest item in the data was closed in 9.2.2014, which 
was 75 days from the date of collection. Thus, the time interval was 75 days 
from 9.2.2014 to 25.4.2014. 
 
Searching with a keyword brings some unwanted items to the results. For ex-
ample, searching for “IPhone” brings up also phone accessories and other 
phone-related items. To reduce this, only items posted in the category 
/osasto/puhelimet/matkapuhelimet-apple/898 were accepted. In addition to this, 
also items that were not fully functioning were deleted by hand. One auction 
was deleted, as it ended with a bid of 9999999999,99 EUR, which was not con-
sidered as serious bid. Since this thesis focuses on bidding at online auctions, all 
items without bids were obviously left out. 
 
Since the Moomin mugs are not as easy to categorize (they can be seen both as a 
kitchenware and collectible items), reduction to only one category was not pos-
sible. Instead, the items’ names were carefully checked by hand and every auc-
tion with anything else than a single intact Moomin mug were deleted. The 
search query “muumimuki” did not contain many unwanted results, making 
this task quite effortless. 
 
These are examined further in the following chapter.  
 
3.1.2. Overview of the Data 
 
The data consisted of 2258 auctions, from two categories: IPhones and Moomin 
mugs. The descriptive statistics are in table 1, which contains details of the data 
from two perspectives: at auction-level and at bidder-level. The descriptive sta-
tistics are examined with more detail in this chapter. 
 
On the 75 day period, there were 447 auctions in IPhone-category and 1781 auc-
tions in Moomin mug-category, making the trading volume of Moomin mugs 
significantly higher. The highest bid was in the Moomin mug-category, which 
rose up to 3605 €.The mug was from the limited Christmas 2004 collection made 
for Karl Fazer Café. As a curiosity, only 400 were ever made, making it one of 
the rarest Moomin mugs. Highest bid in the IPhone-category was 999€, which 
was placed on a golden color IPhone 5S. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 N Mean Std. deviation Min Median Max 
Number of bids in auction       
-IPhone 483 8,77 10,29 1 4 72 
-Moomin mugs 1781 7,39 8,17 1 5 109 
Number of bidders in auction       
-IPhone 483 4,25 3,56 1 3 21 
-Moomin mugs 1781 4,10 3,24 1 3 23 
Auction duration (days)       
-IPhone 483 5,97 4,13 1 5 15 
-Moomin mugs 1781 8,67 4,14 1 8 15 
Highest bid in auction (EUR)       
-IPhone 483 253,51 165,73 10,00 201,00 999,00 
-Moomin mugs 1781 58,40 101,49 1,00 38,00 3605,00 
Last bid time (minutes)       
-IPhone 483 1179,73 2955,73 0,28 62,47 19781,40 
-Moomin mugs 1781 2074,26 3766,94 0,58 242,33 20378,73 
Bidder’s feedback score       
-IPhone 1046 88,99 228,21 -4 19,50 3629 
-Moomin mugs 1712 145,20 349,36 -2 32 6984 
Auctions participated       
-IPhone 1046 1,96 2,30 1 1 27 
-Moomin mugs 1712 4,26 8,34 1 2 153 
Bids submitted       
-IPhone 1046 2,74 3,40 1 1 38 
-Moomin mugs 1712 5,89 11,89 1 2 180 
Bids submitted per auction       
-IPhone 2053 1,40 0,93 1 1 13 
-Moomin mugs 7297 1,37 0,89 1 1 13 
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The auction durations were a little longer in Moomin mug-category, averaging 
in 8,67 with a median of 8. On the IPhone-category, the mean was 5,96 and the 
median 5.  The almost identical standard deviations show that they are similar-
ly distributed. Differences in the auction durations do not have any impact on 
bidding strategies. 
 
The number of bidders participating in an auction was about the same in both 
categories, averaging in just above 4. In the auctions, the bidders in the IPhone-
category placed on average one bid more (8,40) than in Moomin mug-category 
(7,39), while the median number of bids was one fewer (4 in IPhones, 5 in 
Moomin mugs). This may be an indicator for dissimilar bidding strategies be-
tween the two categories. For more details, see figure 1. 
 
Bidders in Moomin mug-category were considerably more active. Over the 75 
day period, one bidder placed 5,89 bids on 4,26 auctions on average, which was 
twice as much bids on over twice as many auctions than in IPhone-category. 
The standard deviation was also substantially higher, which suggests that while 
the mean was higher, there were still some less active bidders as well. For more 
details about the number of bids submitted in auctions, see appendix 1. 
 
The most active bidder was marklai from the Moomin mug-category, who par-
ticipated in a whopping 153 auctions in the 75-day-period. On average, he par-
ticipated in more than two auctions every day. In the IPhone-category the most 
active bidder participated in only 27 auctions. The mean number of auctions 
participated was 1,96 in IPhones, while the mean was over twice as high in 
Moomin mugs. 
 
By comparing the differences between the observations of auctions versus the 
observations of bidders, it can be seen that there was significantly more unique 
bidders in the Moomin mug-category. The ratios for auctions/unique bidders 
were 25% for IPhones and 57% for Moomin mugs, indicating that the group of 
bidders varies faster in IPhone-category, hinting that the bidders in the Moomin 
mug stay active bidders longer. The cycle of replacing handset phones was over 
6 years in Finland in year 2010, which explains the difference for its part (Entner 
2011:2). 
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The feedback scores were significantly higher in the Moomin mug- category.  
Where the bidders in IPhone-category had the mean feedback of 88,99, it was 
145,20 in the Moomin mug category. The standard deviation of feedback scores 
was significantly higher in Moomin mugs (349,36) than in IPhones (228,21). The 
highest feedback score in the data was user grus grus’s score of 6984. These are 
discussed with more detail later in figure 2. 
 
 
Table 2. All observed bids:  distribution between normal bids and automatic 
bids. 
 Normal Bids Automatic Bids Total 
IPhone 2867 1367 4234 
Moomin mugs 9963 3197 13160 
Total 12830 4564 17394 
 
 
All observed bids in the data are presented in table 2. Because the bids submit-
ted using the automatic bidding mechanism do not possess the information of 
the bidder’s feedback score, they are not examined in this thesis.  
 
As can be seen from table 2, the proportion of automatic bids was significantly 
higher (32,3%) in IPhones than in Moomin mugs (24,3%). This finding also hints 
that the bidding strategies are different in the two categories. This raises an in-
teresting question, which is whether the high amount of automatic bids should 
be taken into consideration when evaluating the results. Clearly, if the group of 
instantly outbid bidders is completely random, the missing data points would 
not cause problems. If they are not, they should be taken into account one way 
or another. 
 
As there are no existing studies about the bidders who get instantly outbid, the 
problem needs to be approached differently. One way to approach this problem 
is to examine what really happens when a bidder gets outbid. First, he sees a 
currently highest bid and compares it to his own valuation of the product. After 
this, he places his bid and instantly sees that he is outbid. He then (1) continues 
to bid until he reaches his own valuation or (2) his bid exceeds the previous 
bidders’ automatic bid. In the first case (1), we will never know his feedback 
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score, but there is a reason to believe that he is relatively less experienced (since 
he is using the incremental bidding strategy, see Ockenfels & Roth 2006: 316-
317; Engelberg & Williams 2009). In the second case (2), his feedback score ulti-
mately becomes visible, making it to the data and eliminating the need to exam-
ine the hidden bids. 
 
On this basis, it can be argued that overall, the automatically outbid bids either 
(1) leave out some of the relatively smaller feedback scores or (2) do not have an 
effect. Ultimately, the hidden bids should not be given too much consideration 
hen examining the results.  
 
Bids submitted per auction was calculated at auction level per bidder, hence the 
bigger number of observations (N of bidders times mean of auctions participat-
ed). The results indicate that there is no significant difference in the number of 
bids submitted between the two product categories. Only non-automatically 
submitted bids are included in this number, as they can be linked to the bidder. 
If they could be identified, the number of bids in auction would be roughly the 
same as mean number of bids submitted per auction times mean number of 
bidders participating in auction, and number of bids in auction divided by 
number of bidders in auction would be the roughly equal to bids submitted per 
auction. In reality, the slightly higher use of automatic bids in IPhone-category 
(see appendix 2) make them submit a bit more bids on average (2,06 compared 
to 1,80) 
Figure 1. Cumulative distributions of numbers of bidders per auction. 
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As can be seen from figure 1, the two categories had almost similar cumulative 
distributions of bidders per auction (Pearson’s R = 0,980, p < 0,01). The biggest 
group in both categories was auctions with 1 bidder. Auctions with 1-3 bidders 
consisted of over half of the data in both categories. From table 1we can see that 
the median number of bidders per auction was 3 in both categories, and the 
mean was slightly over 4. The standard deviation was also roughly the same in 
both categories. From these remarks it can be stated that any differences in bid-
ding strategies between the two categories cannot be explained by the differ-
ences in numbers of bidders in auctions. 
 
Distributions between bidders’ feedback levels are represented in figure 2. As 
can be seen from table 1, the bidders were less experienced in the IPhone-
category, than in Moomin mugs. 12% of all bidders in IPhone-category had zero 
feedback score, while the number was only 7% in the Moomin mug-category. 
On the contrary, 29% of the bidders in Moomin mug.-category had over 100 
feedback score, while the number was only 20% in the IPhone-category. Most 
bidders in both categories had their feedback score between 11 and 100 (40% 
IPhone, 38% Moomin mugs). Bidders with little experience (1-10) represented 
28% in IPhones and 25% in Moomin mugs.  
 
Figure 2. Distributions of bidders by feedback score  
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3.2. Statistical Tests 
 
This chapter consists of the methods used to test the hypotheses. First, in chap-
ter 3.3.1 tests are conducted for hypothesis 1, or the late bidding hypothesis. 
This is done by constructing two linear mixed models, in which the minutes 
until the end of the auction are regressed against the bidder’s feedback score 
and bidders in the auction. The random-effects are clustered at auction-level in 
both models. 
 
 Hypothesis 2 is tested in chapter 3.3.2. First, the mean amount of bids submit-
ted per auction is examined with different feedback levels. This is to test wheth-
er the amount of bids is associated with the feedback score. After this, the actual 
hypothesis is tested, which is whether or not submitting a single bid becomes 
more prevalent with feedback. This is tested by conducting a simple cross table 
of bidders with different feedback levels divided into two groups based on if 
they placed a single bid or not. 
 
All tests were made using the IBM SPSS 22 software. In all tests, every bid in the 
data is treated as a separate observation. Feedback scores are treated as absolute 
values. To take into account the different characteristics (see chapter 3.2) in the 
two product categories, all tests are conducted separately to the two categories. 
 
3.2.1. Late Bidding 
 
In the paper by Wilcox (2000), the last minute bid hypothesis was tested by ex-
amining all the bids submitted in the last minute, which were then divided into 
five different groups by the level of experience. This was possible, since the 
EBay-auction model has a hard-close ending method. As discussed before, the 
Huuto.net auction model uses the soft-closing method, hence determining the 
exact moment of closure is unfeasible and some other approach is needed.  
 
The test by Ockenfels & Roth (2006: 313-316) had a similar approach. Their test 
measured the bids submitted in the last 10 minutes of an auction. Because of the 
hard-close ending in EBay, determining the time of ending was straightfor-
ward. In Amazon, they set the deadline to the original ending time, which was 
to be extended if last-minute bids occurred. As a dependent variable they used 
a dummy variable, which had value 1 if the bid was submitted in the last 10 
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minutes of an auction. However, because of the restrictions in the data, this test 
was not possible to conduct with the data collected from Huuto.net. 
 
A more promising approach can be found in the paper by Livingston (2010).  
Using a linear mixed model, he regressed the number of minutes remaining in 
the auction at the time of submitting the bid against the bidder’s feedback score 
and the amount of bidders participating in the auction. To reduce the correla-
tion between bids in the same auction, the bids were clustered at the auction 
level, using the auction ID as the random effects component. This model is 
more suitable with the Huuto.net-model, as it doesn’t require identifying the 
exact moment of the auction’s close and it eliminates the auction-specific effects. 
  
Similarly to the paper by Livingston (2010), two different models were con-
structed. Both models take into account the effects of other participating bid-
ders. Since the amount of bidders was scraped straight from the auction page, 
in includes every bidder that participated in the auction – even those whose 
bids were superseded by automatic bids. 
 
Model 1 assumes the relationship between FEEDBACK and MINLEFT is linear. 
It regresses the difference of the time of submitting the bid and the actual end of 
the auction (MINLEFTij,) against the level of feedback (FEEDBACKij) and the 
number of bidders in the auction (BIDDERSij). Random-effects component is 
included in the error term (ci + uij). 
 
MINLEFTij = αij  + FEEDBACKijβ1 
   + BIDDERSij β2 
   + (ci + uij), 
 
Model 2 is otherwise identical, but instead of testing the raw feedback score, the 
bids are divided into five categories. This approach takes into account the pos-
sible nonlinearity in learning. The bidders with zero feedback are the omitted 
category, while the remaining bids are divided into four quartiles. The four 
quartiles are indicated by using dummy variables to verify whether or not the 
case belongs to the quartile. Hence, FEEDBACK1ij     … FEEDBACK4ij are the co-
efficients for each quartile. Other variables remain unchanged. On this basis, 
model 2 is as follows: 
  
(8)
  [   (  ) 
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MINLEFTij = αij  + FEEDBACK1ij β1 
   + FEEDBACK2ij β2 
   + FEEDBACK3ij β3 
   + FEEDBACK4ij β4 
   + BIDDERSij β5 
   + (ci + uij) 
 
 
Results from the linear mixed regressions are in table 3. By definition, the con-
stant term shows what the value of the function is when all explanatory varia-
bles are set to zero. Examination of the constant term shows that the bidders 
placed their final bids much earlier in the Moomin mug-category. The constant 
for Moomin mugs was 4104,011 (model 2), while it was 1569,556 in IPhones 
(model 2). In other words, the difference is almost two days (42 hours). This 
indicates that the final bids are not placed similarly in the item categories; in-
stead the bidders in Moomin mugs tend to place their bids much earlier. Most 
probably this is explained by the longer durations of auctions in Moomin mug-
category, which was shown in table 1. 
 
Estimates from model 1 show that when the feedback score rises by 1, the bid-
der places her bid 0,582 minutes earlier (p < 0,10) and in IPhones 0,989 minutes 
earlier (p < 0,005). They both are statistically significant and the effect is seem-
ingly stronger in the IPhone-category. Both of the estimates are positive. Thus, 
bidders shift away from late bidding and this effect is linear. 
 
Model 2 provides similar results. For IPhones, the bidders in quartiles 1-2 do 
not have a statistically significant difference, as the estimates do not have a sig-
nificant difference. Still, the values slightly increase reaching a significant dif-
ference of 588,647 in quartile 3, and finally in quartile 4, they reach the highly 
significant value of 1147,412, meaning that they submit their last bids almost 19 
hours earlier than the bidders with 0 feedbacks. Like the results from model 1, 
this indicates that there is indeed a change in the bidding strategy but this 
change is not towards late bidding. Thus, hypothesis 1 can be accepted in the 
IPhone-category. 
  
(9)
  [   (  ) 
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Table 3. Effect of feedback score on time of submitting bid. 
Dependent 
variable: 
MINLEFT 
IPhone Moomin mugs 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Feedback score 0,582 (1,83)*  0,989 (5,34)***  
Score is in:     
Quartile 1  211,898 (0,64)  -828,233 (-2,36) ** 
Quartile 2  257,598 (0,77)  -1193,357(-3,40) *** 
Quartile 3  588,647 (1,76)*  -272,657 (0,78) 
Quartile 4  1147,412(3,42)***  407,640 (1,16) 
No. of Bidders 220,685 (5,68)*** 215,443 (5,57)*** 426,931 (14,57)*** 416,418 (14,23) *** 
Constant 1958,499 (7,67)*** 1569,556(3,98)*** 3420,196 (18,69)*** 4104,011 (11,12)*** 
Observations 2053 2053 7297 7297 
Note: t-score in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
In the Moomin mug-category, the results are much different. The bidders in the 
first two quartiles (feedback score 1-53) place their bids 13 - 16 hours later than 
the omitted category. The results are significant at 5% in quartile 1 and at 1% in 
quartile 2. These results indicate that there is a tendency to shift towards late 
bidding in the lowest quartiles. After this in quartiles 3 and 4, the estimates rise 
close to the omitted category and have no statistically significant difference. 
Because of the results in the highest 2 quartiles it can be stated, that while gain-
ing feedback, the bidders do not shift towards the late bidding strategy, and the 
hypothesis 2  can be accepted also in the Moomin mug-category. 
 
The values of the estimates show the difference against the omitted category, 
which are the bidders with zero feedback. If we take a closer look at the results 
from model 2 in both categories (figure 3), we can see that the change in bid-
ding behavior is actually towards the same direction. The effect is about the 
same size in groups q2- q4. This implies that the differences in the estimates 
might be explained by the different behavior of the bidders with zero feedback. 
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Figure 3. Estimates from model 2 in both categories 
 
It is worth noticing that some users with zero feedback could be in fact shill 
bidders. One of the characteristics of a shill bid is indeed that it’s placed in the 
early phase of an auction (Trevathan & Read 2009: 13), which would cause the 
results to shift just like in the data. However, there are numerous other charac-
teristics that are also linked to shill bidding (for example number of bids, con-
centration of bids on one seller etc., for more details see Trevathan & Read 2009, 
Dong, Shatz, Xu & Majundar 2012), and testing whether there is actually large 
scale shilling in Moomin mugs, is definitely out of this thesis’ scope. 
 
Overall, these results show that while there is definitely a tendency to change 
the timing of the last bids while gaining experience (measured by feedback), the 
shift is away from late bidding, thus hypothesis 1 is accepted. 
 
3.2.2. Single Bidding 
  
The data used by Wilcox had one disadvantage of testing H2. His data had the 
information of numbers of bids and bidders per auction, and because of the 
EBay’s then policy, information of only the last bid submitted by the bidder. 
Because of this, he tested the multiple bids hypothesis by dividing the auctions 
to two groups by the mean experience of bidders in the auction. After this, he 
compared the average of bids in auctions. His findings were that in auctions 
with common value component the highly experienced bidders were less likely 
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to place more bids. However, in the private values category there was no signif-
icant difference. (Wilcox 2000: 372) 
 
Luckily, EBay’s policy was changed on October 2000 and Ockenfels & Roth 
(2006: 316-317) were able to collect more detailed data. Their intention was to 
test what causes incremental bidding and did this by regressing the number of 
submitted bids per bidder with the feedback score, the number of bidders and a 
couple of other variables. They found that the coefficient for feedback was sta-
tistically significant and negative. 
 
The data collected from Huuto.net has the information of unique bidder’s bid-
ding behavior, thus in this thesis it’s possible to test the hypothesis using direct-
ly the information about unique bidders’ behavior. Because of this, it’s possible 
to conduct detailed tests. 
 
 
 Table 4. Comparison of means of submitted bids in all ended auctions by feed-
back score. 
Feedback IPhone Moomin mugs 
 Observations Mean Observations Mean 
0 210 1,543 (1,363) 271 1,365 (0,867) 
1-10 533 1,432 (0,879) 1578 1,423 (0,921) 
11-100 817 1,379 (0,946) 3048 1,391 (0,955) 
> 100 493 1,325 (0,713) 2400 1,295 (0,762) 
Total 2053 1,396 (0,933) 7297 1,365 (0,887) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses 
 
From table 4 we can see that on average, bidders place almost as much bids on 
average in both groups. Also the learning curve can be seen in both groups: the 
bidders with less experience placed more bids than the highly experienced bid-
ders. The shift is clearer in the IPhone-category, where the highest number of 
bids is submitted in the lowest group with 0 feedbacks, averaging in 1,543 per 
auction. The average number of bids lowers gradually reaching 1,325 in the 
group of bidders with over 100 positive feedback score. 
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The shift is also visible in the Moomin mug-category, although the bidders with 
zero feedbacks placed less bids (mean 1,365) than those who had 1-10 feedback 
(mean 1,423) and even those with 11-100 (1,391). The most experienced bidders 
placed 1,295 bids on average, which was the lowest point in the whole data. 
 
These results hint about the possible correlation between learning and shifting 
towards the single-bid strategy. They also indicate that the learning curve 
would be linear in the IPhone-category and that this learning effect would be 
more pronounced in the IPhone-category. This result would be in line with the 
results in the study of Wilcox (2000: 372), in which the bidders bidding on pure-
ly private value-auctions were more likely to submit a single bid. 
 
The results of Between Groups- analysis and linearity tests are in tables 5 and 6. 
The differences between group means were significant (p<0,05%) in the Moom-
in mug-category and also significant in the IPhone-category (p<5%). This shows 
that there bidders with different levels of feedback did in fact submit a different 
amount of bids. Next, we have to verify whether this difference was linear from 
group to group.   
 
From table 5 we can see that the test for linearity has a highly significant value, 
thus we can conclude that there is a linear relationship between the number of 
bids submitted and the level of feedback in the Moomin mug-category. Howev-
er, the test for deviation from linearity is also statistically significant; hence a 
nonlinear component is also present.  
 
Results from table 6 also show a highly significant value for test for linearity. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship is linear also in the IPhone-
category. The test for deviation from linearity is not significant, thus there is not 
a nonlinear component present. The differences in the non-linear component 
could be expected because of the odd results of 0-feedback-bidders in the 
Moomin mug-category. Nevertheless, the explanation for such behavior re-
mains a mystery. 
 
What remains after examining the means and verifying their linearity, is meas-
uring the association. Table 7 shows that the R squared value was close to zero 
in both categories. Simply put, although there were statistically significant dif-
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ferences in both categories and while these differences were linear, the amount 
of variation that the level of feedback explained was small. 
 
 
 Table 5. ANOVA table of Moomin mugs. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. ANOVA table of IPhones. 
 
 
Table 7. Measures of association. 
 R R Squared Eta Eta Squared 
Moomin mugs 
Number of bids * Level of Feedback 
 
-,048 ,002 ,057 ,003 
IPhone 
 Number of bids * Level of Feedback 
-,065 ,004 ,067 ,004 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Number of 
bids 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) 18,891 3 6,297 8,036 ,000 
Linearity 13,208 1 13,208 16,855 ,000 
Deviation 
from 
Linearity 
5,683 2 2,842 3,626 ,027 
Within Groups 5715,070 7293 0,784   
Total 5733,962 7296    
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Number of 
bids 
Between 
Groups 
(Combined) 7,942 3 2,647 3,049 ,028 
Linearity 7,582 1 7,582 8,731 ,003 
Deviation 
from 
Linearity 
,361 2 0,180 0,208 ,813 
Within Groups 1779,312 2049 0,868   
Total 1787,255 2052    
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Difference in the number of observations (Count) and their expected values 
(Expected Count) indicate that the two variables are not independent. This dif-
ference is also called residual. For easier interpretation, residuals in tables 3 and 
4 are adjusted so that they have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Values 
over 1,96 can then be interpreted as significantly different (at 5%), meaning that 
values below -1,96 indicates values significantly lower than the expected value, 
vice versa. 
 
 In addition to this, the Pearson chi-square test for tables 8 and 9 are represented 
below the cross tables. This is needed to interpret the statistical significance of 
any differences in the tables. The Pearson chi-square shows how likely the dif-
ferences have arisen from chance: values close to 1 indicate that the differences 
are completely due to chance while values close to 0 indicate that the differ-
ences are unlikely to occur by mere chance. 
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Table 8. Cross table between single bids and feedback levels in IPhones. 
 Single Bid Total 
False True 
Feedback 0 Count 56 154 210 
Expected Count 49,8 160,2 210 
Adjusted Residual 1,1 -1,1  
1-10 Count 140 393 533 
Expected Count 126,4 406,6 533 
Adjusted Residual 1,6 -1,6  
11-100 Count 181 636 817 
Expected Count 193,8 623,2 817 
Adjusted Residual -1,4 1,4  
>100 Count 110 383 493 
Expected Count 116,9 376,1 493 
Adjusted Residual -0,8 0,8  
Total Count 487 1566 2053 
Expected Count 487 1566 2053 
Notes: * = Count of single bids differs significantly at the 5% level from the expected count 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4,565a 3 0,207 
N of Valid Cases 2053   
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 49,81. 
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Table 9. Cross table between single bids and feedback levels in Moomin mugs. 
 Single Bid Total 
False True 
Feedback 0 Count 58 213 271 
Expected Count 61,4 209,6 271 
Adjusted Residual -0,5 0,5  
1-10 Count 399 1179* 1578 
Expected Count 357,3 1220,7 1578 
Adjusted Residual 2,8 -2,8  
11-100 Count 714 2334 3048 
Expected Count 690,1 2357,9 3048 
Adjusted Residual 1,4 -1,4  
>100 Count 481 1919* 2400 
Expected Count 543,3 1856,7 2400 
Adjusted Residual -3,7 3,7  
Total Count 1652 5645 7297 
Expected Count 1652 5645 7297 
Notes: * = Count of single bids differs significantly at the 5% level from the expected count 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16,866a 3 0,001 
N of Valid Cases 7297   
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 61,35. 
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After analysing the adjusted residuals in table 8, we see that the observations 
are very close to their expected values in the IPhone-category. Rejecting the null 
hypothesis (that there is not a tendency to shift towards single bidding –
strategy while gaining experience) would require at least an association be-
tween the two variables. However, Pearson Chi-Square value of 0,207 indicates 
that there is no association between the variables, nor was there any dependen-
cy in the values in the cross table. Overall, the results do not contain any evi-
dence of any dependency between the variables. Thus, hypothesis 2 must be 
rejected for the IPhone-category. 
 
The Moomin mug– category (table 9) instead offers more promising results. The 
number of observations differs significantly from the expected count in two 
levels of feedback. In the group of bidders with 1-10 feedback, there were fewer 
bidders submitting single bids than expected. This implies that those bidders 
were placing more bids in the auctions than was expected. On the other hand, 
the most experienced bidders placed single bids more frequently than expected, 
implying that they were employing the single bid-strategy.  The Pearson Chi-
square-value (p=0,001) also hint that there is a statistically strong association 
between the variables. The results in the Moomin mug- category are then just as 
hypothesized. The most experienced users were more likely to submit only one 
bid, when the less experienced placed more than one bid.  
 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is accepted in the Moomin mug-category, but not in the IPh-
one-category. Similar results were found in the controlled experiment by Ariely 
et al. (2005: 903), where incremental bidding was reduced, but not eliminated 
with experience measured by feedback score. Other studies have also found 
that the bidding wars induced by other bidders using the incremental bidding 
strategy increase the number of bids (Ariely et al. 2005: 896; Ockenfels & Roth 
2006: 317).  From table 1, we can see that the mean amount of submitted bids 
per auction was slightly higher in IPhones (8,77 ÷ 4,25 = 2,06) than in Moomin 
mugs (7,39 ÷ 4,10 = 1,80). The different behavior of bidders in the IPhone-
category may explain these findings. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis consisted of two different parts. In the first part the theoretical ap-
proach to the bidding strategy was introduced. It was found that the optimal 
bidding strategy in EBay was to postpone bidding until the last moments of the 
auction. However, the different ending rule used in Huuto.net made this strate-
gy no longer dominant and it was suggested that the time of placing the last 
bids would be whenever the bidders noticed the auction, which would make 
the timing completely random. The dominant strategy of single-bidding was 
same in both auction-models. 
 
 Previous results have shown that the bidders tend to shift their strategy while 
gaining experience (measured by feedback score). With respect to this, the bid-
ding strategies were tested against the absolute values of the bidders’ feedback 
scores. The theory was tested in the second part using the same approach as the 
previous studies: two regression models for hypothesis 1, and a correlation test 
for hypothesis 2. 
 
Surprisingly, when it comes to timing, the bidders in the Finnish Huuto.net auc-
tion site seem to shit to just the exact opposite strategy than previous results 
from EBay have shown. This was shown in chapter 3.3.1, where two linear 
mixed models were used to test hypothesis 1. In both product categories, the 
experienced bidders had a greater tendency to place their bids earlier than those 
with little experience.  What makes this surprising is that there is no theory 
supporting that early bidding would be the dominant strategy. Nevertheless, 
the different ending rule seemed to shift the bidders away from late bidding, 
which was just as hypothesized. 
 
These results were similar to those of Ockenfels & Roth (2006: 313-316). In their 
paper they tested whether the bids submitted in the last 10 minutes of an auc-
tion were impacted by the bidders’ feedback score, using data from both EBay 
and Amazon. Even while their intention was to examine late bidding, their 
findings showed that feedback scores were negatively correlated with the late 
bids. It is worth noting that their results were based on a data from November 
1999 – January 2000, collected in the other side of the globe, but the results were 
still similar.  
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One other explanation that comes in mind is that the bidders might the shift to 
start using automatic bids and submit an early automatic bid in the earlier 
phase. To rule this explanation out, the use of automatic bids were examined 
and tested against the bidders’ feedback scores. The results show that the high-
ly experienced bidders actually used less automatic bids; hence the use of au-
tomatic bids can’t be the explanation (for more details, see Appendix 2). 
 
The single bid-hypothesis was tested in chapter 3.3.2., where it was found that 
the highly experienced bidders placed in fact less bids in both categories. It was 
found, that the effect was linear and statistically significant. It’s worth noticing 
though, that the sheer number of feedback score explained only a small amount 
of the variability. 
 
In addition to this, a second test was conducted. This was to test whether or not 
the bidders placed only single bid in the auction. This time the results were not 
similar in the two product categories. In the Moomin-mug category, the bidders 
with low feedback score were less likely to place a single bid, while the most 
experienced bidders had a greater tendency to do so. In the IPhone-category, 
there was no such tendency, even when the bidders were more likely to place 
less bids in an auction.  
 
On this basis, hypothesis 1 can be accepted, and hypothesis 2 must be rejected 
in the IPhone-category. The only hypothesis to reject then is hypothesis 2 in the 
IPhone-category. In other words, late bidding behavior is not prevalent in 
Huuto.net, but single-bidding is. It is more pronounced when a clearer common 
value component is present. It also becomes more evident with experience, 
however when the presence of common value component is less clear, there is 
no longer evidence of  pure single bidding strategy. This may also be explained 
by the strategies used by other bidders. Overall, the mean feedback scores of 
single-bidders were higher in both product categories. 
 
For future research, a very interesting finding was that the bidders placed their 
bids in an unexpected way, as no theory suggests “early bidding” even with the 
soft-close ending method. Further research on this topic is needed. Also, it 
would be interesting to see what kind of results the shill-identifying algorithms 
would get from Huuto.net. There were some minor hints that suggested the 
possibility of shill-bidders amongst the bidders with zero feedback in the 
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Moomin mug-category. However, it is too early to draw any conclusions about 
to which extent shill-bidding occurred in the data. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix 1. Cross tabulations of submitted bids. 
Moomin mug Feedback Total 
0 1-10 11-100 >100 
Submitted Bids 1 213 1179 2334 1919 5645 
2 35 248 466 354 1103 
3 12 88 148 78 326 
4 7 35 50 30 122 
5 2 11 21 5 39 
6 1 11 10 4 26 
7 1 3 5 5 14 
8 0 3 6 1 10 
9 0 0 3 4 7 
10 0 0 3 0 3 
11 0 0 1 0 1 
13 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 271 1578 3048 2400 7297 
 
 
IPhone Feedback Total 
0 1-10 11-100 >100 
Submitted Bids 1 154 393 636 383 1566 
2 32 78 118 76 304 
3 12 47 34 22 115 
4 7 8 12 9 36 
5 0 3 7 2 12 
6 2 3 4 1 10 
7 0 0 4 0 4 
8 1 1 1 0 3 
9 1 0 0 0 1 
10 0 0 1 0 1 
13 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 210 533 817 493 2053 
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Appendix 2.  Percentage of bidders using automatic bids. 
 N %-automatic Standard Deviation 
Feedback IPhone MM IPhone MM IPhone MM 
0 210 271 27 % 20 % 0,443 0,403 
1-10 533 1578 26 % 21 % 0,436 0,410 
11-100 817 3048 22 % 19 % 0,416 0,392 
>100 493 2400 20 % 15 % 0,398 0,358 
Total 2053 7297 23 % 18 % 0,420 0,386 
Notes: MM = Moomin mug 
 
 
 
 
 
 
